Men are going to want to stop paying alimony when the former wife starts living with another man or when another man lives with the former wife. The argument is that the former husband does not have to continue to pay the alimony if the former wife is in a “supportive relationship” with another person. Most marital settlement agreements (MSA) will contain language that if the former wife “cohabits with another male” the alimony will terminate.

The Former Wife challenges the trial court’s order that terminated the obligation of the Former Husband to pay permanent periodic alimony. The trial court based its order on a ruling that the Former Wife had been engaged in “cohabitation with a male” within the meaning of the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (the MSA).

The Former Husband cross-appeals. He challenges the trial court’s findings that the Former Wife was not engaged in a “supportive relationship” within the meaning of section 61.14(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and that there was no substantial, permanent change in the circumstances of the parties that would support a reduction or termination of the alimony obligation.

Both the Former Husband and the Former Wife testified without objection at the final hearing concerning their respective understandings regarding the meaning of the clause in the MSA providing for the termination of the alimony obligation in the event the Former Wife cohabited with a male.

Unsurprisingly, this testimony was largely self-serving. The Former Wife expressed her understanding that the alimony would terminate only in the event that she lived with “a boyfriend” who helped to pay her bills.

The Former Wife emphasized that Mr. Doe did not qualify as “a boyfriend” and that he might move out of her home at any time. On the other hand, the Former Husband’s view was that the alimony was to terminate automatically if the Former Wife resided with any male nonrelative.

“A marital settlement agreement entered into and ratified by a trial court is subject to interpretation as a matter of law like any other contract.” Hobus v. Crandall, 972 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

A trial court’s decision concerning whether or not cohabitation has been established involves a mixed question of law and fact. Thus in reviewing such a decision, we employ a mixed standard of review. Review of the trial court’s factual findings is limited to determining whether they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Cf. Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 953.

In accordance with the provisions of the parties’ MSA, the Former Husband’s obligation to pay alimony was to terminate upon the Former Wife’s “cohabitation with a male.” There is no dispute that Mr. Doe had been living in the Former Wife’s residence from May 2010 through the date of the final hearing. The question that we are called upon to decide is whether the circumstances surrounding Mr. Doe’s presence in the home and the relationship between him and the Former Wife amounted to cohabitation within the meaning of the MSA.

However, our review of the trial court’s construction of the term “cohabitation” and its legal conclusions regarding whether cohabitation has been established is de novo. See Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First Am. Holdings, Inc., 982 So. 2d 628, 632 (Fla. 2008); cf. Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 953. Upon a determination that cohabitation has been established, our review of the trial court’s decision to reduce or to terminate alimony is for abuse of discretion. Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 953; Zeballos v. Zeballos, 951 So. 2d 972, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

What is Cohabitation?

We may look to dictionaries and the Florida case law to arrive at the meaning of the term “cohabitation.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “cohabitation” as “[t]he fact or state of living together, esp. as partners in life, usu. with the suggestion of sexual relations.” Black’s Law Dictionary 296 (9th ed. 2009).

According to The Oxford English Dictionary, “cohabitation” means “[l]iving together as husband and wife (often with the implication of not being married).” 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 449 (2d ed. 1989).

This court had occasion to address the meaning of cohabitation in a case involving a marital settlement agreement providing that the husband’s obligation for alimony and child support would terminate at “such time as the wife shall remarry, die, or live with another person in a conjugal relationship.” Herrero v. Herrero, 528 So. 2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (emphasis added). In considering the meaning of the contractual phrase, “live with another person in a conjugal relationship,” this court noted its agreement with the following proposition:

[C]ontract terms of this genre should be regarded as having principally an economic purpose. They are not meant to penalize an alimony recipient on moral grounds for indulging in an intimate relationship. Such agreements are intended to relieve a payor of alimony from further obligation under circumstances where the recipient is supporting another or receiving support from another in a state of cohabitation appropriate to the marriage state.

Because similar contract terms in marital settlement agreements are intended to protect the payor spouse from a continuing obligation to pay alimony when the payee spouse is residing with another person under circumstances similar or tantamount to marriage, a finding of cohabitation requires more than the mere presence of another person under the payee spouse’s roof.

Was Cohabitation Proven?

In this case, the Former Husband failed to establish that the Former Wife was cohabiting with Mr. Doe. Granted, at the time of the final hearing, Mr. Doe had been living in the Former Wife’s residence for more than three years. Nevertheless, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Doe was sharing the Former Wife’s home “as a tenant,” paying her “$400 per month in rent pursuant to a rental agreement.”

The trial court’s finding of fact that Mr. Doe was living in the Former Wife’s home as a tenant is supported by competent, substantial evidence. The $400 per month that Mr. Doe paid to the Former Wife was consistent with a sum paid by a lodger for the rental of a room in a house; the amount was not so great that it suggested a general sharing of all household expenses.

During the period of Mr. Doe’s residence, he and the Former Wife maintained separate bedrooms and they did not have an intimate relationship. Although the Former Wife and Mr. Doe were friends, the time that they spent together was limited. They did not generally take meals together. The Former Wife and Mr. Doe each had relationships with members of the opposite sex.

They did not hold themselves out as husband and wife. Mr. Doe did not assume any designated chores at the residence such as doing the dishes, vacuuming the carpet, or mowing the lawn. The Former Wife and Mr. Doe never pooled their money or resources.

On the Former Wife’s appeal, we reverse the order because the trial court erred in ruling that the mere presence of a male tenant in the Former Wife’s residence amounted to “cohabitation with a male” within the meaning of the MSA. We affirm on the Former Husband’s cross-appeal because the trial court’s findings with regard to the absence of a “supportive relationship” and a substantial change in circumstances are supported by competent, substantial evidence.